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M U S I C T H E O R Y O N L I N E
A Publication of the
Society for Music Theory
Copyright (c) 1994 Society for Music Theory
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| Volume 0, Number 6 January, 1994 ISSN: 1067-3040 |
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All queries to: mto-editor@husc.harvard.edu
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AUTHOR: Stephen Smoliar
TITLE: Comment on John Roeder's article
KEYWORDS: Roeder, semiotics
REFERENCE: mto.93.0.5.roeder.art
Stephen Smoliar
National University of Singapore
Institute of Systems Science
Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Kent Ridge, SINGAPORE 1027
smoliar@iss.nus.sg
[1] As a computer scientist I have to confess that it is
often difficult for me to stifle a choke whenever I
confront the word "semiotics." While I have the greatest
respect for the heritage of the discipline, I also feel it
is important to recognize that its pioneers were restricted
by the intellectual equivalents of stone axes. When they
worked with symbols and codes, the only tools they had were
their own pencils and papers. That they were able to
achieve as much as they did is admirable, but it more than
a little tragic to think that there are still those who are
blind to the limitations of those tools.
[2] It did not take long for the computer pioneers to
recognize that their machines could manipulate symbols just
as easily as numbers. (Turing was certainly well aware of
this, although I am not sure I would credit him as being
the first of have the insight.) Even when John von Neumann
wrote his first computer program (documented by Donald E.
Knuth in Volume 2, Number 4 of *Computing Surveys*) he
realized that it was easier to work with symbols than "raw"
binary code. The need for computer programs which would
process such symbolic codes was a very early insight which
was quickly followed by the recognition that any such
program would have to be based on models of the syntax and
semantics of those codes.
[3] One might argue that work on machine translation of
*natural* languages got off to a false start due to
*ignorance* of semiotics--particularly the insight that
there was more to language than syntax and semantics.
Nevertheless, we eventually dug ourselves out of that hole.
What is more important today is that we now have very
powerful systems at our disposal which allow us to
manipulate symbol structures; and I find it a bit
difficult to wade through much of the arcane language of
the semiotic theorists when it seems to me as if it could
all be articulated so much easier in LISP. (This is not to
say that LISP solves all problems. Rather, it often helps
us to formulate clearer questions, even when answering
those questions turns out to be very difficult.)
[4] Having gotten all that off my chest, I would like to
provide my own take on what "Toward a Semiotic Evaluation
of Music Analysis" is really all about. From where I sit
(one hand on my Macintosh keyboard and the other at the
piano), the key problem of music analysis is one of
*description*; and the key problem of description is that
it cannot be readily reduced to a simple exchange of
symbolic codes. Put in the bluntest and most obvious way,
a description of a music experience is not the same thing
as a description of an algorithm. When I need to describe
an algorithm to my computer, I know that I have to respect
certain *a priori* conventions assumed by the machine as to
how I use my symbols to communicate. When I need to
describe a music experience, I cannot always assume that
those conventions exist, let alone identify what they are.
[5] The task of description, as it applies to music
analysis, is founded on two agents: the agent giving the
description and the agent receiving it. Those two agents
are rarely "of the same mind," so to speak. (They
certainly do not have identical mental states, no matter
what particular philosophy of mental state you happen to
subscribe to.) Therefore, description is not so much a
matter of the describing agent passing a code to the
receiving agent as it is a matter of the two agents
mutually negotiating towards a point where they have some
confidence that they are both talking about the same thing.
[6] Within a community of experts (such as those who haunt
meetings of the Society for Music Theory, for example),
negotiation can often be minimized. Music theorists
constitute what Donald Schoen calls a "community of
practice," within which *some* *a priori* conventions of
communication can be assumed. However, since most music
theorists are interested in talking about new things, it is
often the case that novelty goes beyond the limits of those
conventions; so even within a well-defined community of
practice, the need for negotiated communication is always
present.
[7] From this point of view, Roeder offers a key insight.
However, it is more an insight about negotiation than about
codes. Mathematics, graphical representations, and
narrative are not codes which mediate our analyses.
Rather, they are our negotiating tools: different
resources upon which we can draw when, in undertaking the
task of description, we have to confront the problem of
whether or not the receiving agent is really "getting it."
Furthermore, if that receiving agent is not giving us any
feedback (which is what happens when we are writing a paper
rather than engaging in face-to-face dialog), then we might
do well to consider how we may effect a *synthesis* which
brings all three of those tools to bear.
[8] I am currently reviewing David Lewin's new book,
*Musical Form and Transformation* for *Computer Music
Journal*; and I am trying to argue that Lewin has
succeeded in such a synthesis in the four analyses in this
book. I mention this because I think one of the most
important moments in Lewin's *Music Perception* paper,
"Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception," is
when he introduces the concept of "music behavior." The
descriptive act of music analysis is yet another instance
of that behavior. As such, we should think about it in
terms of its behavioral implications rather than trying to
reduce it to an exchange of codes.
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END OF MTO ITEM